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Abstract This paper examines from a cognitive perspective the rhetorical and
epistemic advantages that can be gained from the use of (extended) metaphors in
political discourse. We defend the assumption that extended metaphors can be
argumentatively exploited, and provide two arguments in support of the claim. First,
considering that each instantiation of the metaphorical mapping in the text may
function as a confirmation of the overall relevance of the main core mapping, we
argue that extended metaphors carry self-validating claims that increase the chances
of their content being accepted. Second, we show how the recognition of an
extended metaphor’s sophistication and relevance (on behalf of the addressee) can
benefit the speaker’s perceived competence (ethos). We then assess whether these
two arguments measure against the dual epistemic monitoring postulated in the
notion of epistemic vigilance (i.e., assessment of the source of a message and
assessment of the message) and conclude that extended metaphors may fulfil the
requirements of epistemic vigilance and lead to the stabilisation of a belief. We
illustrate our account with an analysis of the extended metaphor of the USA as an
empire found in a political pamphlet written by the Swiss politician Oskar
Freysinger.
Keywords Understanding  Believing  Extended metaphor  Relevance 
Epistemic vigilance  Argument
S. Oswald (&)
English Department, University of Fribourg, Av. de l’Europe 20, 1700 Fribourg, Switzerland
e-mail: steve.oswald@unine.ch
S. Oswald  A. Rihs






Metaphors have long been considered to function as rhetorical devices fulfilling
strategic goals in argumentative exchanges. As many rhetorical figures, they are
believed to be particularly effective, sometimes more than literal formulations,
when it comes to convincing an audience. This paper takes this claim seriously and
attempts to examine, from an argumentative perspective informed by cognitive
insights about information-processing, the extent to which metaphors—and in
particular extended metaphors—may bring about epistemic effects geared to
positively affect message acceptance.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the argumentative potential of extended
metaphors,1 in particular when these are used in political discourse to metaphor-
ically represent entities of the world. Specifically, we will contend that multiple
instantiations of the conceptual properties of a same metaphorical construal can
fulfil an argumentative function: recurring exploitations of a metaphor can indeed be
argumentatively articulated so as to converge towards the justification of the
proposed metaphorical construal in some sort of confirmational dynamics, so much
so that the metaphor may cease to be perceived as one, turning what was at first
metaphorically construed into a representation about an actual state of affairs one
can believe to be true. By combining this conception of metaphor as argument with
recent work on epistemic vigilance in cognitive anthropology and psychology (see
Sperber et al. 2010), we will try to characterise the rhetorical advantages offered by
the structure of extended metaphors in terms of speaker ethos but also in terms of
the epistemic strength of the content of the message. In other words, we will try to
cognitively ground the claim that the careful construction of an extended metaphor
may positively impact speaker credibility and trustworthiness but also the
audience’s perception of the truth of the message. We will illustrate these two
arguments with the analysis of a pamphlet published on the website of Oskar
Freysinger, a member of the National Council of Switzerland (the lower house of
the Federal Assembly) and a representative of the conservative right-wing party
Union De´mocratique du Centre. In this pamphlet, Freysinger weaves the metaphor
of the USA as an empire. We will show that the way the extended metaphor is
constructed can be described as an argumentative strategy whose outcome is to
convince the audience that the USA is actually literally an empire, and therefore that
action should be undertaken for protection.
Our account is meant to explain how extended metaphors can constitute powerful
argumentative devices. However, we will neither claim that extended metaphors are
necessarily argumentative, nor that they cannot fulfil other functions. We focus on
contexts in which speakers pursue legitimising goals and our account should
therefore be understood as describing and explaining some strategies that can unfold
within said contexts.
1 As a preliminary note, let us state that we will not claim here that all extended metaphors are
necessarily convincing. Rather, we discuss their potential as an argumentative strategy speakers can opt
for in discursive contexts where they want to convince an audience; we will show how this can be done,
in light of the analysis of a political pamphlet where an extended metaphor is exploited throughout the
text to ground a specific standpoint.
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From an epistemological perspective, we adopt Relevance Theory’s account of
meaning construction (see for instance Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002),
which, as far as metaphor is concerned and contrary to a widespread belief, is
compatible to a certain extent with the cognitive linguistic account of metaphors
(see Wilson 2011; Gibbs and Tendahl 2006). Following Wilson (2011), who
highlights interfaces between both theories, even if the notion of conceptual
mapping is not ‘‘essential to either the production or interpretation of metaphors’’
(2011, p. 53), we do believe that it can be contextually relevant for an addressee to
represent such mappings as he processes metaphors, in particular extended and
novel metaphors which are not instances of conceptual metaphors such as LOVE IS
A JOURNEY, ARGUING IS FIGHTING or TIME IS SPACE, as our analysis will
show.2 In other words, we posit that the hearer might be led to consider in specific
contexts which invite him to do so, and particularly when processing extended
metaphors, that the metaphor maps (i.e., systematically establishes correspondences
between) representations, thereby inviting him to construe one conceptual domain
(the target domain) in terms of the properties of another representation (the source
domain).3 In other words, we consider that extended metaphors can typically make a
particular metaphorical mapping relevant, even more so when what is at stake is an
explicit assessment of the proposed metaphorical construal. Underlying our study is
also the general assumption that an account of how people process and understand
language—and in the case at hand, metaphorical language—is a first step in
accounting for the mechanisms governing belief fixation in communicative
exchanges. To sum it up in two key-words, we will focus on the relationship
between understanding and believing and accordingly try to highlight the
importance of comprehension with respect to beliefs (see also Oswald 2011).
Section 2 reviews some aspects of metaphor processing and motivates the
following assumptions: (1) extended metaphors may fulfil an argumentative
function and can be used to self-legitimate their conceptual mapping, the
consequence of which could be a literalisation of the metaphor and (2) they
simultaneously positively impact perceived speaker competence. Section 3 illus-
trates the suggested account with the analysis of an extended metaphor contained in
Freysinger’s pamphlet. Section 4 summarises the arguments advanced to this end
and concludes on the relevance of cognitive insights to argumentation studies and
discourse analysis more generally.
2 We adopt the conventional notation by which speakers are referred to as females and addressees as
males.
3 This is why we will occasionally use the traditional terminology of Cognitive Linguistics with the
following definitions: a conceptual domain is defined as ‘‘any coherent organization of experience’’
(Kovecses 2002, p. 4); the source domain as ‘‘the conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical
expressions to understand another conceptual domain’’ (ibid.) and the target domain as ‘‘the conceptual
domain that is understood this way’’ (ibid.). The term ‘mapping’ denotes a ‘‘set of systematic
correspondences between the source and the target in the sense that constituent conceptual elements of B
[the source] correspond to constituent elements of A [the target]’’ (ibid., p. 7).
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2 Metaphors, Meaning, Discourse and Argumentation
2.1 Metaphor and Meaning: Costs and Benefits
There is a great deal of experimental work on the nature of metaphor processing
(see Gibbs and Tendahl 2006 for a review). In particular, quite some effort has been
devoted to exploring the issue of whether metaphor processing is cognitively costly,
and whether the conventional or novel nature of metaphors influences processing
effort.
Noveck et al. (2001) and Glucksberg (2001), among others, have shown that
conventional metaphors are relatively unproblematic in processing terms: their
comprehension does not require significantly longer reading times compared to
literal equivalents. One could thus suspect that the degree of conventionality of a
given metaphor may play a significant role in the derivation of its meaning.
Conventional metaphors might be easily accessible mainly because the same
encyclopaedic information has been selected over time as they have been repeatedly
processed, which could also be interpreted in terms of the familiarity and salience of
their conventional meaning (see Giora 1999). In turn, this would suggest that
conventional metaphors convey lexicalised meanings.4 For instance, if the
interpretation of (1)—which is conventionally interpreted as meaning something
like (2)—
(1) Jeffrey is a clown
(2) Jeffrey is a joker
is not particularly costly in terms of processing effort, this is presumably because
being a joker, among other things, is part of the intension of ‘clown’; the metaphor’s
conventionality is somehow determined by the accessibility to a prototypical
relation (here, the information that clowns are supposed to be jokers by definition).
In that respect, the way conventional metaphors are processed does not significantly
depart from the way literal language is processed.
It could be argued that novel metaphors, on the other hand, can differ from
conventional ones in two ways: (1) the relevant features involved in the
representation are not those which are normally selected; (2) the relevant conceptual
properties involved in their interpretation may be completely unexpected, which
forces the hearer to build up a representation from conceptual properties that have
not previously been mobilised together. To illustrate this last point, imagine that (1)
is uttered in a context involving a discussion about Jeffrey’s shoe size: in such a
scenario the hearer is led to reassess the metaphorical potential of ‘clown’ in order
to single out a less salient property such as a clown’s unusually big shoe size, which
4 Wilson notes that the process of ad hoc concept formation—which is taken to characterise metaphor
processing—is the same for both lexicalised and non-lexicalised metaphors: ‘‘The adjustment process
may be a spontaneous, one-off affair, involving the construction of an ‘ad hoc’ concept which is used
once and then forgotten; or it may be regularly and frequently followed, by a few people or a group, until,
over time, the resulting ‘ad hoc’ concept may stabilise in a community and give rise to an extra
lexicalised sense (Sperber and Wilson 1998; Vega Moreno 2007; Wilson and Carston 2007)’’ (Wilson
2011, p. 52).
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will allow him to infer that Jeffrey has unusually big feet. In this case, metaphorical
creativity is defined by the fact that the properties selected in the source domain are
not lexically the most salient ones, and therefore not the most accessible within the
concept’s intension. Arguably, novel metaphors inherit their creativity from the fact
that the particular metaphorical operation they call for has seldom, if never, been
processed before.
Under this view, the cognitive operations involved in the comprehension of both
conventional and novel or creative metaphors are of the same kind. What
distinguishes them is whether the information sets required for their interpretation
are the ones that are usually mobilised or not. This, however, is not sufficient to
conclude that conventionality entails ease of processing and novelty the opposite
(see Gibbs and Tendahl 2006). This is because metaphors hardly ever have to be
interpreted in neutral contexts. In fact, strong contextual constraints (such as
thematic constraints for instance) will generate expectations about the type of
contents that will be contextually relevant at a given time. These constraints may
very well facilitate metaphor processing, even in cases of novel metaphor. To go
back to example (1), it seems reasonable to assume that in a conversation about the
size of people’s feet, (1) will not cause particular interpretative problems and
straightforwardly lead to the interpretation that Laszlo has big feet, precisely
because in such conversation participants are expected to contribute information
that is relevant to the topic. In Gibbs and Tendahl’s terms, ‘‘it will be the context
that determines how quickly we can process a metaphorical utterance of whatever
kind’’ (2006, p. 396). The importance of context in the interpretation of metaphors
thus seems to suggest that, more than processing effort, it is the nature of the
information sets selected to perform interpretative tasks that determines ease of
processing.
In our analysis we will take extended metaphors as a case in point and argue that
their processing triggers significant cognitive effort on the addressee’s behalf—if
only because many different properties of the same core metaphorical construal
need to be cumulatively processed throughout the text. As we adopt a relevance-
theoretic perspective on the issue (as per Sperber and Wilson 1995; Wilson and
Sperber 2012; Carston 2002), we will consider that the cognitive cost of the
procedure has to be offset by some sort of benefit;5 in the case of extended
metaphors argumentatively exploited, for instance in political discourse, we suggest
that this benefit can amount to the fulfilment of expectations about the argumen-
tative purpose of the metaphor.
Relevance Theory (henceforth RT) distinguishes the interpretative procedure
metaphors trigger (which is not idiosyncratic) from the effects they produce (which
show some particularities, especially when the metaphor is novel). On the
processing side, and similarly to literal approximations, the interpretation of
5 Relevance theory postulates that human cognition is governed by a principle of relevance according to
which information is processed following a cost/benefit dynamics. One of the fundamental claims of the
account is that establishing the relevance of any verbal input consumes cognitive resources and yields
cognitive benefits such as the improvement of one’s knowledge of the world (see Sperber and Wilson
1995). Relevance is therefore defined here in terms of balance between processing effort and cognitive
effect.
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metaphors is taken to rely on a lexical loosening device, which widens the word’s
literal denotation in order to make for the designation of a neighbouring concept.
This mechanism, along with its narrowing counterpart in cases of meaning
specification, is referred to as ad hoc concept formation (see e.g., Carston 2002,
2010; Wilson 2003). On this view, lexical meaning—including metaphorical
meaning—is said to accommodate contextual constraints of relevance so that the
specific intended meaning communicated by the metaphor is able to vary alongside
contextual variation. As Carston puts it, ‘‘the description of such concepts as ‘ad
hoc’ reflects the fact that they are not linguistically given, but are constructed online
(on the fly) in response to specific expectations of relevance raised in specific
contexts’’ (Carston 2002, p. 322).
On this account, ad hoc concepts are taken to be constructed in order to satisfy
expectations of relevance in the meaning derivation procedure of lexical items: the
lexical meaning of a concept thus becomes a pragmatic function of context, which is
determined by the communicative needs of the speaker in every communicative
exchange. The first cognitive benefit of the cognitive mechanism of ad hoc concept
formation therefore has to be interpreted in terms of its contribution to the
identification of speaker meaning. This perspective is in particular the one
advocated by Noveck et al. (2001), who evaluate the cognitive benefits of metaphor
in terms of better comprehension. Such a benefit is particularly straightforward in
the case of conventional metaphors: their comprehension amounts to the derivation
of a stable and predictable meaning, and since the latter is conventional, it can be
taken to be derived pretty much the same way stable and predictable meanings are
derived from literal approximations.
The effects produced by novel and creative (or poetic) metaphors in particular
can be more complex and somewhat different. The relevance-theoretic model of
lexical pragmatics holds in this respect that creative metaphors can be responsible
for the generation of an array of weak implicatures. These are implicit contents
which express a speaker’s complex thought efficiently and faithfully, but which are
identified as being intended by the speaker only with a low degree of reliability (see
Blakemore 1992, pp. 128–132 and Sperber and Wilson 1995, pp. 197–202 for a
discussion). In particular, the grounds on which addressees identify weak
implicatures are far from strong, and as a consequence it may be fairly tricky for
the hearer to ascertain whether the speaker intended to make manifest that she
wanted the hearer to identify them as being meant by her. In relevance-theoretic
parlance, weak implicatures are contents the communicative intention of which is
not mutually manifest (see also Sperber and Wilson 2008). A particularly vivid
example of this phenomenon is to be found in creative metaphors in poetic texts: the
range of weak implicatures they are likely to license is dependent to a great extent
on the addressee’s own experience of the text he is reading (and obviously on his
general background knowledge, preferences, etc.). Example (3) provides a clear
illustration of this:
(3) ‘‘My neighbour is a dragon’’ (Blakemore 1992, p. 163)
When uttering (3), the speaker may convey that her neighbour is unfriendly and
fierce, but additional weak implicatures might also be drawn, such as ‘the speaker’s
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neighbour has the appearance of a dragon’ or ‘the speaker’s neighbour is terrifying
beyond imagination’. These are not necessarily publicly endorsed by the speaker,
but they would indeed offset processing cost, to the extent that the speaker has
manifestly precisely not uttered the literal equivalent. Yet, in so doing, she has
encouraged the addressee to further process the utterance to discover additional
implicit contents. These are contents that ‘‘justify the speaker’s utterance as the best
means of representing his thoughts, and it is these implicatures which explain why
even this rather standardized example of metaphor cannot be paraphrased without
loss’’ (Blakemore 1992, pp. 163–164).
Both conventional and creative metaphors achieve relevance by being under-
stood; some of them are furthermore able to trigger weak implicatures, resulting in
the derivation of richer meanings. But these are cognitive effects strictly limited to
processes of meaning derivation, and, as such, are matters of illocutionary concern.
In this paper, we will consider possible perlocutionary effects of metaphoric
creativity, in particular as to what regards belief fixation, by defending the idea that
the relevance of an extended metaphor—through the satisfaction of expectations of
relevance that can go beyond comprehension—can positively affect the acceptance
of a belief derived from the content of the metaphor.
2.2 The Discursive Nature of Extended Metaphors
Extended metaphors are realised in discourse through the recurring exploitation of
the same metaphor at several conceptual levels over a relatively long span of text.
Their interpretation, in those cases, can accordingly be seen as an incremental
process which gradually enriches the representation as different properties of the
source domain successively appear in one form or another throughout the same
discourse. A given text or discourse contains an extended metaphor when ‘‘a
metaphorical field extends through an entire discourse’’ (Werth 1994, p. 83). They
are generally found in poetic and literary works, since they may ‘‘express more
abstract emotional experiences for which no sui generis language exists’’ (ibid. p.
84). They can nevertheless be used for other purposes, to the extent that they may be
used to ‘‘make the expression more striking (the ‘flowers of rhetoric’ approach)’’ or
to allow ‘‘the topic to be viewed simultaneously from more than a single
perspective’’ (ibid.). In all three cases, however, extended metaphor can be
characterised as involving poetic choice.
From a cognitive pragmatic perspective, such poetic phenomena may be
approached through the notion of weak implicature, as seen above, in order to deal
with the effects of extended metaphor in terms of meaning potential. As far as
cognitive processing is concerned, and assuming that the search for relevant
correspondences between the source and target domains can be at the heart of their
interpretative process, extended metaphors appear to be demanding in terms of
effort, since understanding them and establishing their relevance will require the
addressee to perform, if not unexpected conceptual associations, at least multiple
ones. Trivially, extended metaphors involve significant cognitive processing because
they extend through discourse. Once they are recognised as such, extended metaphors
will thus generate expectations for further—and perhaps even full—exploitations of
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the conceptual mapping. What an extended metaphor does, then, is encourage the
addressee to keep on exploring several aspects of the proposed metaphor in terms of
an elaboration of the construal the speaker wants to convey. Extended metaphors can
consequently be said to involve complex multi-stage representational operations
triggered cumulatively as discourse unfolds.
The processes involved in these representational steps are inferential; that is, they
require the hearer to combine information contained in the linguistic form with
contextual information in order to derive conclusions in the form of additional, new,
representations. From the analysis of an excerpt of A Passage to India by E. M.
Forster, Werth suggests that the inferences required to process the extended
metaphor can also lead to the revelation of an ‘‘underground metaphor’’ (Werth
1994, p. 85) which the hearer is supposed to extract from the text. Extended
metaphors may therefore provide the grounds for rich inferential work geared
towards the derivation of specific conclusions. We owe this possibility to the
discursive nature of extended metaphors: the conclusions we draw from them ‘‘are
cumulative, and, crucially, achieved by way of text and discourse processes, rather
than sentence processes’’ (ibid.).
The discursive realisation of the metaphorical elaboration involved in extended
metaphors makes it approachable with discourse-analytical tools. Notably, as
already highlighted by several scholars (see e.g., Kimmel 2009; Koller 2003), the
discursive notion of coherence could be used to describe the way metaphorical
operations within a same text can ‘hold together’, notably in terms of thematic
coherence. Interestingly, coherence in itself is a complex notion which can be
characterised by means of many different types of relationships between discourse
constituents; this is the main tenet of approaches to discourse such as Rhetorical
Structure Theory (see Mann and Thompson 1988), which postulates that the
relationship of justification is one such relationship of coherence. In other words,
argumentation is one way of building coherence. Yet, it has also been argued, from
a cognitive perspective, that coherence can be reinterpreted in terms of relevance
(see Reboul and Moeschler 1996). Under this view, judgements of coherence follow
from the perception of relevance between discourse constituents. Therefore, if the
multiple occurrences of an extended metaphor throughout a text are not only
mutually relevant but also relevant with respect to the core metaphor exploited in
the text, addressees will be drawn to perceive the overall extended metaphor as
relevant.
Owing probably to the literary nature of the corpus analysed therein, the research
referred to in what precedes tackles little more than effects of meaning, even if some
do point to the argumentative and persuasive dimension metaphors may exploit
(e.g., Koller 2003, p. 120). We argue that in particular cases—for instance in
political discourse—extended metaphors are ideally suited to contribute material
that can be used for argumentative purposes, this being made possible by the
subordination of metaphorical occurrences, throughout the text, to a core metaphor
(see Sect. 2.3.2 below for a development of this idea). We suggest that extended
metaphors can be used to convince their audience of the truth of certain states of
affairs, this in turn making them good candidates to implement persuasive
strategies. The various occurrences of an extended metaphor in a text can therefore
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be argumentatively used so as to function as a set of justifications for the metaphor
in some sort of confirmational dynamics: every occurrence of an additional aspect of
the source domain, to the extent that it is mapped onto the target domain in a
plausible (see below) manner, may serve as a confirmation of the overall relevance
of the initial metaphorical construal.
2.3 Metaphor and Argumentation
2.3.1 Metaphor in Argumentation Theory
Literature on the role of metaphor in argumentation is not very extensive (see
Santiba´n˜ez 2010). As far as modern-day argumentation theory is concerned,
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (2008[1958]) are probably among the researchers
who addressed the issue of metaphor in most detail in the twentieth century. Their
account of metaphor within argumentation is formulated along the lines of
arguments by analogy, thereby making ‘argumentative’ metaphors a subtype of
arguments establishing the structure of reality: ‘‘We could not, at this point describe
metaphor better than by conceiving of it, at least in what regards argumentation, as a
condensed analogy, resulting from the fusion of an element of the phoros with an
element of the theme’’ (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 2008, p. 535).6 In the New
Rhetoric, metaphors are moreover said to play a complex instrumental role as
contents which are used to legitimise analogies, inasmuch as they can ‘‘intervene to
accredit the analogy’’ (ibid. p. 536), but also as contents that are derivable on the
basis of the analogy itself: ‘‘(…) oftentimes the author does not hesitate, during his
presentation, to make use of metaphors which have been derived from the proposed
analogy, thereby habituating the reader to see things as he [the author] shows them
to him’’ (ibid.).
Although this account is more focused on the argumentative nature of metaphor
in terms of argument schemes, it does make room for remarks on the rhetorical
advantages of metaphorical discourse, as it also considers that the ‘‘fusion of the
theme and the phoros, which brings their respective domains together, facilitates the
realisation of argumentative effects’’ (ibid.). And crucially, we find an idea here that
is very relevant to the purpose of this paper—and which we will echo in cognitive
terms further along—, namely the idea that exploiting a mapping between source
and target domain at length (i.e., repeatedly) is one way of making the argument
stronger in terms of its convincingness: ‘‘When, through the development of an
analogy, we strive to draw conclusions from the phoros that are relevant to the
theme, the force of the argument will be more important if, thanks to the fusion of
the theme and the phoros, we have previously described at length the phoros in
terms of the theme’’ (ibid.). Translated in cognitive linguistic terms, Perelman and
Olbrechts-Tyteca may be understood to contend that the more you exploit the
metaphor, i.e., the more you instantiate your target domain in terms of your source
domain in an argument, the stronger the argument. We will also shortly show how
this very idea can receive a cognitive reinterpretation in terms of relevance.
6 All translations from original texts in French are ours.
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Going along the rhetorical path, more recent insights can be found in Plantin’s
work (2011) on the topic. Following Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, Plantin
considers that argumentative metaphors rest on a mechanism of analogy, and that
extended metaphors in particular are to be construed as specific forms of structural
analogy, whereby ‘‘the argumentative operation consists in drawing the sceptic’s
attention to the fact that ‘if the domains are analogous, then their corresponding
elements are too’ (…)’’ (Plantin 2011, p. 120). More interestingly, he mentions that
the rhetorical effectiveness of a metaphor is partly determined by the addressee’s
inferential input in working out metaphorical meaning: ‘‘From a rhetorical point of
view, it [the metaphor] has been appraised as a condensed comparison, the
elucidation of which has been entrusted to the audience’’ (ibid., p. 122, our italics).
What we think is at stake here is some kind of pleasure or ‘cognitive’ reward—
already present in Aristotle’s characterisation as noted by Kirby (1997)—associated
to the full grasping of the metaphorical meaning; in this sense, the addressee’s
cognitive processing in comprehending the metaphor and its relevance is necessary,
even if probably not sufficient, for the metaphor to be rhetorically effective.
Another element in Plantin’s work is worth mentioning here, as our cognitive
account of metaphor as argument will develop along similar lines: it has to do with
the status of extended metaphors after they have been exploited at length. Plantin
considers that ‘‘the argumentative force of metaphor is due not only to the fact that,
like analogy, it introduces a model of the target situation, but also to the fact that it
pushes the analogy over to the point of identification’’ (ibid., p. 123). Extended
metaphors, provided they are exploited in a way that is perceived as relevant by the
audience, can lead to an identification of source and target domains. If we take the
argument further, this could mean that argumentatively exploited metaphors can
lead to a ‘de-metaphorisation’ of the construal. In so doing, extended metaphors
might be able to provide grounds for a whole new set of further inferences that
become, pretty much as Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca contend, legitimised or
accredited by a metaphor.
While Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca construe metaphors as taking part in the
structure of arguments from analogy, Santiba´n˜ez departs from this conception by
arguing that arguments from metaphor are not necessarily arguments from analogy,
mainly on the grounds that similarity is not as important in metaphor as it is in
analogy (see Santiba´n˜ez 2010, pp. 976–977 for a discussion). He then moves on to
discussing the role of metaphors in argumentative chains, and in doing so, he
focuses on metaphor not in structural terms, but in terms of content and in terms of
the argumentative function it might fulfil. His conclusion, dovetailing with the
Toulminian perspective, is that metaphors can act as backings. In other words,
metaphors have legitimising potential in so far as they can function as major
premises in an argument. For instance, if I want to argue that one individual is
responsible for the decay of an entire community by uttering ‘Jeffrey is the rotten
apple of our community’, I may resort to the proverb ‘A rotten apple spoils the
barrel’: the informational import of the proverb will be selected (and thus deemed
relevant) as the major premise linking the standpoint (‘Jeffrey is responsible for the
decay of the whole community’) and the premise that Jeffrey is metaphorically the
‘rotten apple’ of the ‘barrel’ (i.e., the community in which he lives). This is
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something that is also relevant to our own purposes, to the extent that Santiba´n˜ez
focuses on the representational—as opposed to the formal—aspects of metaphors in
argumentation. Beyond its relationship with analogy, metaphor is above all a
conceptual phenomenon responsible for the generation of particular representations
which people can communicate; paying attention to the specificities of these
representations becomes relevant if we are to perform a rhetorical analysis of
arguments from metaphor.
Although some other studies in argumentation revolving around the notion of
metaphor (see e.g., Plug and Snoeck Henkemans 2008; Lakoff 2006; Pielenz 1993)
are available, for the purposes of this paper we will restrict ourselves to the aspects
discussed above. Suffice it to highlight for the time being that metaphors have been
said to play a fundamental role in argumentation in terms of the rhetorical
possibilities they open up and in terms of the constraints they can impose on the
representation of propositions that will be used as premises and conclusions in
argumentative chains.
2.3.2 Extended Metaphors as Argumentative Devices: A Cognitive Take7
In Sect. 2.2 we have evoked how extended metaphors are inherently discursive,
insofar as they set up a core metaphorical construal and exploit it throughout
discourse. Such a discursive structure in our view makes for an argumentative
exploitation.
The main idea behind our argumentative account of extended metaphors is that
they are ideally suited, both discursively and cognitively, to provide an argumen-
tative structure where the initial metaphorical construal becomes a standpoint, while
the various instantiations of the metaphor throughout the text function as arguments
in support of this standpoint. In political discourse in particular, where speakers
constantly try to legitimate their claims, this can become an argumentative strategy.
Once the metaphor is set up at the beginning of the text, its extension, by mention of
several of its properties, may provide evidence to legitimise the initial construal. In
order to illustrate this, let us extend Chilton’s analysis of Hitler’s Mein Kampf
(Chilton 2005). In the chapter titled Volk und Rasse, Hitler conceptualises the Jew as
a parasite and tries to justify that it makes sense to take on the proposed construal. In
order to do this, he lists some of the properties associated to parasites and observes
that these are also typical of the Jews. According to Hitler, just like parasites, Jews
(1) are not nomads, (2) spread, (3) are thrown out of host nations, (4) seek a new
feeding ground when this happens, (5) drain their hosts from their resources, etc.
Hitler thus attempts to systematically map the conceptual properties we normally
associate to parasites onto the different properties, in terms of behaviour, of the
Jews. The inherent structure of extended metaphor can thus provide an ideal
argumentative ground to give weight to the metaphorical construal. We show in
more detail in Sect. 3 how this can be achieved.
7 We thank an anonymous reviewer for their insightful questions on a first draft of this section, which
allowed us to sharpen our account.
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The cognitive benefits of this rhetorical strategy now need to be spelled out. We
postulate here that the more plausible the metaphorical mappings exploited in an
extended metaphor are (i.e., the more the addressee perceives that the construal of
the target domain in terms of the source domain is justified), the more its overall
perceived relevance increases. Our use of the notion of plausibility is grounded on
the notion of justification. A metaphorical mapping will thus be deemed plausible if
it is justified, i.e., if the content of the particular instances of the metaphor are
interpretable in terms of arguments. We do not need to impose restrictions on the
type of arguments that may be used to this end for the time being—and this will
remain an open question. We will nevertheless see in our analysis in Sect. 3 that
arguments by example can provide powerful evidence for the justification of a
metaphorical construal. To go back to Hitler’s example, the strategy would unfold
as follows: once the core mapping linking Jews and parasites has been established,
the extension of the metaphor could take each property of the parasite one by one
and systematically link each of those properties to an actual state of affairs. The
accumulation of concrete examples illustrating that the behaviour of Jews matches
the different conceptual properties of parasites would then constitute evidence that it
does make sense to construe them as parasites. At the end of the text, the hearer is
left out with a correspondence matrix pointing to the plausibility of the initial
metaphor. In principle, thus, extended metaphors may be used for legitimation
purposes.
But there is more: sometimes extended metaphors can go beyond the legitimation
of the initial metaphorical construal’s meaningfulness: we claim that extended
metaphors may even be used to provide evidence for the truth of a claim—with the
provision of an enabling context. Of course, in the case of literary texts, it would
make little sense to argue that an extended metaphor is meant to convince the reader
of the literal truth of what was initially construed as a metaphor.8 However, in
political discourse the situation might be different, partly because of the genre
(political discourse is inherently argumentative and prone to containing standpoints
whose truth is justified by the speaker) and partly because the speaker might initially
present a metaphor, which, by being extended, ends up considered as a literal
statement in order to invite concrete reactions on behalf of the addressees. Quite
paradoxically, thus, in light of concrete evidence (in case the construal is extended
so as to appear to be literally true for an unusually important number of properties)
an extended metaphor may become less and less metaphorical throughout the text.
We could then imagine cases in which what justifies the relevance of the extended
metaphor is the impression that the metaphor fades away; under these circum-
stances, extended metaphors might actually become more relevant by failing to
meet the expectations of non-literalness raised by their initial metaphorical status. In
other words, we hypothesise that extended metaphors may lead their addressee to
eventually abandon the metaphorical construal altogether—and this is part of an
8 The anonymous reviewer we referred to in the previous footnote rightly pointed out that one would
never infer from Carl Sandburg’s poem (‘‘The fog comes on little cat feet./It sits looking over harbour and
city on silent haunches and then moves on.’’) that the fog literally has feet.
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argumentative strategy. We claim that this is what happens in the corpus we will
analyse below (see Sect. 3.3.).
In order to specify this claim on cognitive grounds, we will use the notion of
‘‘relevance to an individual’’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, pp. 265–266). The general
idea is that utterances might be deemed relevant not only because they contribute to
comprehension, but also because they are instrumental to the satisfaction of other
cognitive functions, such as ‘‘the reorganisation of existing knowledge, or the
elaboration of rational desires’’ (Sperber and Wilson 1995, p. 266). To these, we
could also add cognitive or epistemic goals such as for instance gaining a better
representation of how the world is in order to take action on more reliable grounds,
which are goals that go beyond the comprehension of the information contained in
the stimulus. On this count, we assume that creative and extended metaphors
perceived as relevant can also contribute to the long-term stabilisation of a given
representation of the world, to the extent that they may be shown as faithful and
accurate descriptions. Creative and extended metaphors perceived as relevant in
terms of their comprehension can subsequently be relevant for other purposes,
including epistemic or argumentative ones. In the case of political discourse,
extended metaphors can give rise to the representation of gradual and near-
systematic confirmations that it makes sense to connect the source and target
domains of the metaphor in the proposed way. One can consequently end up
considering that there are solid grounds to conceptualise the target domain in terms
of the source domain. Furthermore, numerous relevant instantiations of the
mapping, within an enabling context, can have argumentative implications: the
more an addressee is led to find confirmations that the proposed construal is
applicable, the more its content might be believed to reflect actual states of affairs,
which can eventually lead him to consider that the (initially) metaphorical mapping
is actually true—i.e., literal. In such cases, the extended metaphor could be thought
to cognitively function as an argument meant to ‘de-metaphorise’ the metaphor.
The epistemic potential of metaphor has already been proposed in the past: it
echoes for instance some of the assumptions underlying Chilton’s analysis of
fragments of Hitler’s Mein Kampf (Chilton 2005). In this paper, Chilton defends the
use of conceptual metaphor theory and blending theory to explain why ideas are
influential, i.e., why and how they propagate and generate stable representations. To
this effect, Chilton states that
conceptual constructs can become meme-like and ‘infect’ the mind (under the
right social conditions) when they have complex blending potential that
recruits fundamental knowledge domains along with the core mechanisms of
metaphor. There is a further ingredient that seems to go along with textualised
memes of this kind – the delivery of some kind of credibility assurance and
epistemic warrant (Chilton 2005, p. 40, our italics).
According to Chilton, metaphors spread, at least partly, because their propositional
meaning is believable and additionally carries some sort of epistemic warrant,
which is precisely what we are concerned with in this paper. The claim we put forth
is that recurring metaphorical entailments exploited by extended metaphors
contribute to establishing said epistemic warrants, i.e., justifications of the
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metaphor’s content overall adequacy and relevance, which incidentally make for the
‘‘warrant of truth and relevance’’ (Chilton 2005, p. 41) recipients of political
discourse usually expect to find. By ‘overall adequacy and relevance of a
metaphor’s content’, we mean that the propositional content of the metaphor can be
perceived by an addressee to correspond to a faithful representation. To go back to
Chilton’s analysis of Hitler’s words, the idea is that if we are exposed to a series of
examples, illustrations and arguments to support the view that the Jews are
parasites, we may end up adopting the representation that the Jews are parasites
(whatever this might exactly and contextually mean).
The metaphor’s contribution to the propagation of an idea is a perlocutionary
matter,9 as it concerns issues that have to do with the effect of the metaphor on
people’s minds, and, in some cases, also on people’s behaviour. Research in
cognitive linguistics on the rhetorical potential of metaphor (e.g., Chilton 2005;
Lakoff 2006; Charteris-Black 2006) has shown that in principle metaphors and
argumentative utterances are able to generate similar effects. The following section
will be devoted to examining the implications of this claim should we generalise it
to postulate the argumentative potential of metaphorical expressions, and in
particular of extended metaphors.
2.3.3 Extended Metaphors as Conceptual Argumentations: Epistemic Issues
Extended metaphors require the addressee to assess different aspects of the same
metaphorical mapping within the same text and can in principle be exploited to
strengthen the perceived relevance of the construal in a specific way, i.e., by
achieving a ‘de-metaphorisation’ of the initial metaphor. The relationship between
each occurrence of a particular conceptual mapping of properties between source
and target domain and the extended metaphor as a whole can thus be seen as one of
argumentative confirmation of relevance with epistemic implications; if every
mapped conceptual property is found relevant, chances are that this will also count
as a justification of the overall extended metaphor’s relevance (in terms of
conceptualising the target domain through the source domain), and, as we shall
argue, as an attempt to convince the addressee, in light of a complex correspondence
matrix, that the proposed construal can in fact be taken as literal. In other words, by
inviting the addressee to process in depth and at length different aspects of the
extended metaphor, the speaker is weaving an argumentative path in which the
accuracy, legitimacy and/or relevance of the metaphorical mapping is the
standpoint, while the different instantiations of conceptual mappings for different
properties count as arguments in support of said standpoint. Before we turn to the
analysis of the data, let us further elaborate this idea of metaphor as argument.
The assumption that extended metaphors can be conceptualised as complex
argumentations bears at least two implications for their study within a discourse
analytical framework. First, it implies that extended metaphors, as any argumen-
tative device, can be used to convince: in this case, this perlocutionary goal
9 Recall that Austin’s first example of perlocution in the William James Lectures is the act of persuading
(cf. Austin 1962, p. 101).
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translates into attempting to convince the addressee that there are solid grounds to
legitimate the truth of what is metaphorically presented at first, and, ultimately, to
convince the addressee that there are grounds that come from facts and states of
affairs which will allow us to believe the truth of the conceptual construal and
accordingly adopt adequate courses of action.10 Second, it means that metaphors,
just like arguments, may bear a rhetorical function,11 and that as such they are
exploitable as rhetorical strategies, otherwise commonly observed in argumentative
practices. One subset of rhetorical strategies of particular interest to us here lies in
the various ways in which a speaker can positively affect her ethos, which can
roughly be defined as the image the speaker wishes to convey through her words,
particularly in terms of trustworthiness, consistency, competence and benevolence.
The link between rhetoric and pragmatics has already been highlighted in terms
of the relationship between rhetorical figures and conversational aspects of
communication, notably with respect to politeness and face-management issues
(see e.g., Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1994, 2002). Following and extending this line of
argument, we believe that a pragmatic analysis of metaphor can also incorporate a
rhetorical dimension that sheds light on the effectiveness of extended metaphors
with respect to belief fixation, via the examination of the effects that the use of an
extended metaphor that turns out to be perceived as relevant can have on perceived
speaker competence. We therefore postulate that, just like well-thought argumen-
tative demonstrations, well-thought extended metaphors which are recognised as
such can positively influence the speaker’s perceived image.
Rhetoric considers since Aristotle that the effectiveness of arguments depends on
at least three factors: they may convince by virtue of their rational and logical
qualities, their ability to resonate with their audience’s beliefs, desires and
emotional states, but also by virtue of the speaker’s charisma, perceived
trustworthiness, benevolence and competence.12 We postulate that some effects of
extended metaphors can be interpreted as rhetorical, notably in what regards speaker
ethos. The argument goes like this: if the various occurrences of an extended
metaphor in a text achieve overall relevance in his cognitive environment, then the
addressee will be led to entertain a rich and sophisticated representation that he
takes to correspond to a state of affairs the speaker intended to communicate. To the
extent that he recognises this richness and sophistication, he might conclude that
only a knowledgeable and skilful speaker can be responsible for such a dense and
presumably accurate construal. In other words, the hearer can tentatively be led to
postulate the speaker’s competence, for he himself (the hearer) would not have been
able to come up with such a level of conceptual complexity. If the extended
metaphor presents relevant mappings down the line in every occurrence of the
10 We will propose in our analysis that this is what happens in Freysinger’s pamphlet: the initial
metaphor of the USA as an empire is gradually weakened as a metaphor and strengthened as a
propositional content throughout the text in order to lead the addressee to the conclusion that there are
necessary actions to undertake in order to protect Switzerland from the threat.
11 We are here concerned with the argumentative dimension of rhetoric—not so much with its stylistic
dimension—and with the role metaphors play in convincing or persuading the addressee.
12 These are obviously the respective components of the traditional rhetorical triangle composed of
logos, pathos, and ethos.
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metaphor, chances are that in the end, the hearer will be left with the impression that
the speaker perfectly knows how to handle her story.
Specifically, recognising that each occurrence of the metaphor is relevant by
being led to infer that every property instantiated echoes an actual state of affairs
might be seen as analogous to recognising the cogency and validity that
accompanies a solid argumentative chain. The abstract form of a rhetorically
successful extended metaphor can this way be conceptually compared to the abstract
form of a rhetorically successful complex argument: in such an argument the
standpoint S would be presented as true or acceptable by providing arguments X, Y,
Z in support of S; similarly, in a rhetorically successful extended metaphor, the
primary metaphorical mapping is presented as highly relevant and, by successively
advancing specific aspects of said mapping that act as arguments in its support, it
might come to be believed as referring to an actual state of affairs. Each
correspondence thus functions as an argument supporting the conceptual mapping’s
adequacy to the world, thereby de-metaphorising the initial construal. The fact that
the addressee recognises, based on a rich matrix of correspondences, that the
extended metaphor is relevant will arguably lead him to consider that only a
competent and smart speaker (therefore perceived as someone clever, who has spent
significant time and effort reflecting upon the issue, and by extension someone we
can trust) would have been able to conceptualise the correspondences in such a way.
Along these lines, if we consider that extended metaphors can have a self-
argumentative function of legitimation, it does make sense to describe them as
argumentative devices. They draw on linguistic and cognitive mechanisms that are
at play when people assess not only speaker meaning, but also epistemic aspects of
their content, i.e., clues as to whether the information they convey should be
accepted or not. Recent work in cognitive and evolutionary anthropology (cf.
Sperber et al. 2010) has postulated that the selection of communication as a stable
property of human life through evolution supposes that its benefits have outweighed
its disadvantages in the long run, and thus that the human species has found a way of
dealing with cheaters and deceivers while still preserving communication. For
Sperber et al. this means that we have presumably developed some abilities to spot
cheaters and to assess the reliability of communicated material, some kind of ‘‘suite
of cognitive mechanisms for epistemic vigilance, targeted at the risk of being
misinformed by others’’ (Sperber et al. 2010: 359). From this perspective, epistemic
vigilance is defined as a cognitive ability which is intimately linked to the
possibility of communication, in that it appears to be a necessary condition for
communication to stabilise. Sperber et al. indeed note that ‘‘a disposition to be
vigilant is likely to have evolved biologically alongside the ability to communicate
in the way that humans do’’ (Sperber et al. 2010: 360–361).
Epistemic vigilance mechanisms are globally believed to be responsible for the
assessment of (1) the source of the message and (2) the message’s content. As far as
the source is concerned, addressees will typically try to assess speaker competence
(one’s possessing genuinely reliable information) and benevolence (i.e., the
intention of sharing that genuine information) and try to look for evidence of the
speaker’s reliability and overall trustworthiness in order not to be misled or cheated.
Assessment of the source requires a metarepresentational ability, since it supposes
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the necessity of being able to make assumptions about a speaker’s intentions. As far
as message assessment is concerned, the account of epistemic vigilance basically
relies on the relevance-theoretic framework: ‘‘the search for a relevant interpreta-
tion, which is part and parcel of the comprehension process, automatically involves
the making of inferences which may turn up inconsistencies or incoherences
relevant to epistemic assessment’’ (Sperber et al. 2010: 376).
Scanning the source of the message in order to establish its trustworthiness
typically involves assessing whether the speaker is competent. This is where the link
with the rhetorical potential of extended metaphors used in argumentative contexts
comes in: if a speaker is able to work out an extended metaphor in such a way that
what was initially taken as a metaphor ends up being believed as literal, chances are
that the addressee will consider that the speaker is competent, and therefore
trustworthy, which is a condition that maximises the chances of belief fixation—we
believe what the speaker says because we find her reliable. Following this line of
argument, we hypothesise accordingly that rhetorically successful extended
metaphors match the minimal conditions required to go past our epistemic vigilance
monitoring; this, we contend, may in turn be achieved via the implications noted
above on speaker ethos.
But there is more: through the argumentative conception of extended metaphors
we proposed, the second type of assessment managed by our dedicated epistemic
vigilance filters—namely, monitoring the message and tracking inconsistency and
incoherence—may also be passed: if the numerous instantiations of the mapping in
the text are found relevant, the epistemic status of the overall proposed description
will be strengthened, and chances are that the proposed mapping will be accepted as
literal, thus leading to the acceptance of the literal proposition behind the metaphor
(in the example below, the conception of the USA as an empire stricto sensu).
To sum up, let us highlight that the pragmatic account exposed postulates that
extended metaphors may be used by speakers to carry argumentative claims of
legitimacy or self-acceptability, that these depend on whether the multiple occurrences
of the metaphorical mapping in the text are found relevant, and that these claims in return
can positively influence speaker ethos. These properties taken together allow us to
consider extended metaphors as devices that are able to satisfy the requirements imposed
on our information-processing mechanisms by epistemic vigilance filters. Let us now
turn to the analysis of the example in order to illustrate these points.
3 A Case in Point: ‘‘A l’ombre des tours du Mordor’’, Pamphlet Written
by Oskar Freysinger13
3.1 The USA as an Empire: Identifying the Extended Metaphor
As an illustration of an extended metaphor’s interpretative potential and its
implications on argumentative and political issues, we propose an analysis of a
13 ‘‘In the shadow of Mordor’s towers’’. Available on Oskar Freysinger’s official website: http://oskar.
sw1.ch/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=7, last accessed 24.03.2013.
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pamphlet by Oskar Freysinger, one of the prominent figures of the far-right Swiss
political party UDC.14 The text, published on the politician’s personal website,
glorifies the right for countries to be self-determined and praises Switzerland’s
economic and political independence. In that context, the United States of America
are identified as an imperialistic threat for the autonomy of world countries, and in
particular Switzerland’s. Freysinger’s goal in this pamphlet is to convince his
readers that his party represents the only solution to protect Switzerland.
In the text, Freysinger metaphorically construes the USA as an empire. Although
one could at first have doubts about whether Freysinger means this metaphorically,
there are a few indications suggesting that he does indeed. First, the USA cannot
reasonably be literally defined as an empire—and it would be overly charitable to
assume that Freysinger, as a writer, politician and high school teacher, ignores this:
the USA is a democratic regime governed by an elected president, a regime where
executive, judiciary and legislative powers are separated, and a regime which does
not colonise other territories.15 Furthermore, it could be argued from the perspective
of argumentation theory that Freysinger would not even need to try to convince his
readership that the USA is an empire if he thought that the readers already believed
so. As argued within mainstream theories of argumentation (see e.g., Pragma-
Dialectics, van Eemeren and Grootendorst 2004), the standpoint of any argumen-
tative discussion is a proposition that has to be critically submitted to doubt; this
follows from the construal of argumentation as a means of resolving a difference of
opinion. In this pamphlet, Freysinger’s ultimate goal is to justify that we should
indeed construe the USA as an empire and take action in order to protect the country
(by voting for his party), which is an indication that he expects his audience or a
potential opponent not to think that this is the case. We will argue that the strategy
he implements consists in starting from the metaphor and extend it so as to make his
readership come to the conclusion that in fact, the metaphor should be abandoned to
privilege a literal interpretation. But what is perhaps the clearest indication that ‘the
USA is an empire’ is metaphorically intended by Freyinger is his construal of the
American president as the Roman Emperor Nero:
(4) ‘‘And Nero will watch the Christian world of the Occident burn from across
the Atlantic.’’
‘‘Et Ne´ron de regarder bruˆler le monde chre´tien d’occident depuis l’autre coˆte´
de l’Atlantique.’’
Although the metaphor associating the USA to an empire is conventional to a
certain extent (at least in communities where the American superpower is
criticised), the originality of Freysinger’s text lies in an attempt to implicitly but
systematically question the metaphor’s overall relevance as a metaphor, so that the
depiction of the USA as an empire licenses (1) the derivation of representations such
14 The acronym stands for Union De´mocratique du Centre (Democratic Union of the Centre); the
German name of the party is SVP (Schwizerische Volkspartei—Swiss people’s party).
15 We consider colonisation here as physical occupation destined to expand the territory and claim
ownership of the conquered land, which is something the USA does not do. Of course, the USA’s
international influence in many respects is open to discussion; yet, stricto sensu, this is not an empire, like
for instance the Roman or the Ottoman empires were.
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as the need for protection against the empire and (2) weak implicatures enjoining
the reader to sympathise with the political party Freysinger represents. His strategy
is to select characteristic and prototypical properties of empires that can be mapped
as such onto American foreign policy. As a result, the (alleged) adequacy between
prototypical representations of empires and descriptions of facts regarding America
functions as evidence for the construal’s relevance. Consider excerpts (5) to (15),
which refer (either explicitly or implicitly) to identifiable features of empires:
(5) ‘‘[…] in order to spread its humanitarian manna it [the empire] occupies.’’
‘‘[…] pour re´pandre sa manne humanitaire, il occupe.’’
(6) ‘‘he exercises his armies in real situations.’’
‘‘il exerce ses arme´es en situation re´elle.’’
(7) ‘‘and the multiple garden gnomes that always surround the imperial giant
bring the clarion of its conquests to their mouth, take its marching tanks and
cluster beneath its bombers’ wings.’’
‘‘Et les multiples nains de jardin qui entourent toujours le ge´ant impe´rial,
embouchent le clairon de ses conqueˆtes, prennent ses tanks en marche et
s’agglutinent sous les ailes de ses bombardiers.’’
(8) ‘‘The empire knows how to be magnanimous, as long as no one disrupts its
circles.’’
‘‘L’empire sait eˆtre magnanime, tant que l’on ne vient pas de´ranger ses
cercles.’’
(9) ‘‘[…] it is enough for his valets to swear allegiance, to be helpful, to be a
strong link through which the empire chains nations to its particular
interests.’’
‘‘il suffit a` ses valets de faire alle´geance, de se rendre utile, d’eˆtre l’un des
maillons forts par lesquels l’empire enchaıˆne les nations a` ses inte´reˆts
particuliers.’’
(10) ‘‘[…] in order to fertilise resisting territories, it bombards them and pollutes
them.’’
‘‘[…] pour fertiliser les terres qui re´sistent, il les bombarde et les pollue.’’
(11) ‘‘Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq were his favourite toys. Others will follow too
in the future.’’
‘‘La Serbie, l’Afghanistan et l’Irak furent ses jouets de choix. D’autres encore
suivront dans le futur.’’
(12) ‘‘The empire cannot tolerate that something in his circle of influence escapes
its control.’’
‘‘L’empire ne peut tole´rer que dans son cercle d’influence quelque chose lui
e´chappe.’’
(13) ‘‘The current European Union is nothing but a footman of the empire, the mat
by the doors of the Middle East and Asia.’’
‘‘L’Union Europe´enne actuelle n’est qu’un valet de pied de l’empire, le
paillasson aux portes du moyen orient de l’Asie.’’
(14) ‘‘[…] this empty shell [the E.U.] begins to crawl only when the empire injects
its conquering gladiators in it.’’
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‘‘[…] cette carapace vide ne se met a` ramper que lorsque l’empire y injecte
ses gladiateurs conque´rants.’’
(15) ‘‘Over its long history, this small alpine country [Switzerland] has been in
contact with and has confronted numerous empires that have vanished the
same way they once came: in a blood bath.’’
‘‘Dans sa longue histoire, ce petit pays alpin a coˆtoye´ et confronte´ de
nombreux empires qui ont disparu comme ils sont venus : dans le sang.’’
All these are particular instantiations of the main mapping which are relevant to the
overall metaphor of the USA as an Empire. Let us assess in detail what these
amount to.
Freysinger first refers to an empire’s expansionist goals using literal (‘‘occupy’’,
‘‘spread’’) or nonliteral terms (‘‘fertilise’’). In (5), he emphasises hypocritical
pretexts (providing humanitarian aid) that are put forward to legitimise expansion,
and in (10) the bombing referred to denotes radical military means that are deployed
in case of resistance. (6) also mentions the military presence of the USA and (7)
links it to expansionist ambitions (‘‘conquests’’). These continuous conquering
ambitions are reinforced in (11) through the mention of previous occupied territories
(Serbia, Afghanistan and Iraq) and add up to the description. Also, he alludes to the
property of an empire to behave as a centralised authority that exerts governance on
its annexed territories, which is what excerpts (9) and (12) are about. Furthermore,
he underlines that imperial policies enforce domination over weaker entities (the
‘‘valets’’ alluded to in (9)). As an illustration, he insists on the weak position of
servility and dependency the European Union has towards the USA (in (13) and
(14), the EU is depicted as the ‘‘footman of the empire’’ and as an ‘‘empty shell’’).
In addition, Freysinger portrays the empire as militarily powerful (10), just like the
Roman Empire, which seems to be a source of inspiration for him: hints to Rome are
made through references to gladiators in (14) or through the explicit mention,
elsewhere in the text, of an odious ‘‘Pax Americana’’ imposed onto the conquered
world, thus echoing the period of peace imposed by the Roman Empire onto its
conquered territories (the so-called Pax Romana). Finally, in (15) empires are said
to have common births and destinies, since they are bound to emerge and disappear
in violence; this counts as Freysinger’s own prediction about the American empire’s
future.
What is remarkable about most of these examples is that they combine two levels
of the semantic description; namely, they may be interpreted intensionally as
general remarks on empires and at the same time extensionally as specific
observations about the American empire (assuming, as we suggest Freysinger
intends, that the reader ends up considering that the USA is indeed an empire). This
is particularly salient in French where the definite article ‘le’ (in ‘‘l’empire’’) does
not constrain the attribution of a specific referent but may be also used to designate a
general category of items. Even though America is eventually identified by the
reader as the target domain of the metaphor, the interpretative ambiguity persists,
since these descriptions may be applicable to any empire in a nontrivial way. In
other words, although the proposed descriptions are presented as true for the USA,
they are constructed from definitional (or at least prototypical) features of empires:
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our lexical entry for the concept of empire tells us that empires occupy, perpetrate
violent actions, have expansionist ambitions, exert a centralised authority, and so
on. The referential ambiguity caused by the use of the definite article here results in
a perception of America as the empire par excellence, the one which best
exemplifies the conceptual category of ‘‘empire’’.
We have mentioned referential ambiguity from a syntactic point of view with
Freysinger’s use of the definite article when he refers to the empire; we should also
mention that referential uncertainty is furthermore exploited by the absence of any
explicit mention of the USA until late in the text. Given that the concept of
‘‘empire’’ is not indefectibly linked to America, other entities (any economic world-
power, for that matter) or abstract notions (e.g., capitalism, globalism) would at first
also be acceptable candidates as target domains for the metaphorical mapping.
Moreover, at the very beginning of the text, countries’ sovereignty is said to be
threatened by the ‘‘mad dragon of the new world order’’ (‘‘dragon fou du nouvel
ordre mondial’’). This initial metaphor could be misleading for the reader who is
looking for the relevant target domain, dragons being usually symbolically
associated with far Eastern countries such as China for instance—a country which
incidentally also incarnates some sort of ‘‘new world order’’, and which could thus
also turn out to be relevant as a tentative target domain, should the remainder of the
text corroborate it.
Through this presentation of the metaphorical data contained in Freysinger’s
pamphlet, we see how the conceptual mapping is exploited at length in the text. We
now turn to examine some aspects that are related to the way this extended
metaphor might be processed.
3.2 Processing the Extended Metaphor: Cognitive Benefits
We will assume that the interpretation of the extended metaphor of the USA as an
empire throughout the discourse is costly for two main reasons. First, given that
several features of the source domain’s standard representation are given as relevant
within the target domain, their successive instantiations force the reader to
constantly reassess the same conceptual unit. Second, the empire’s prototypical
features themselves are often metaphorically denoted—see excerpts (5), (7), (8), (9),
(11), (13), (14) or (15); these ‘secondary’ or ‘embedded’ metaphors make the
overall interpretation of the extended metaphor more costly and tentatively more
complicated, because they introduce interpretative ‘obstacles’ which arguably
render access to conceptual features more complex from a conceptual viewpoint.
Adding this to the referential ambiguity mentioned earlier, and assuming that the
global effort and effect constraints on comprehension obtain (as per RT), we
conclude that these difficulties represent cognitive burdens that will need to be
compensated in one way or another in this particular context.
If we turn to the potential rewarding effects that would justify the processing
cost, we could postulate that the identification of the relevant target domain, which
constitutes the first step of the interpretative procedure, satisfies a need for basic
comprehension and as such that it may be considered as a cognitively gratifying
effect. However, it should be noted that this operation is not straightforward in the
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text, if only because in the Swiss geopolitical context the most salient candidate for
saturation of the reference to an empire would be the European Union (which is its
closest supra-national power and incidentally one which geographically and
economically surrounds Switzerland). Coupled to the delayed explicit mention of
the relevant target domain, this makes any referential assumption uncertain at the
beginning of the text.16
An additional interpretative benefit that can be gained from the extend
metaphor’s full comprehension resides in the variety of implications it is likely to
license. Once the reader accepts the proposed description of the USA as an empire,
he may search for relevant implications with respect to potential threats for the right
of countries to self-determination (echoed in the final lines of the text, where
Freysinger exalts independence through the slogans ‘‘Long live sovereignty!’’,
‘‘Long live people’s self-determination!’’, and ‘‘Long live freedom!’’). If there is an
empire of which Switzerland is not a part and which surrounds the Swiss territory,
there is indeed a potential threat that it will want to conquer the country and put its
autonomy at risk. In turn, this also bears implications as far as the reaction to the
threat is concerned. These are explicitly confirmed at the end of the text through the
aforementioned slogans pointing to the possibility—and even the need—of
resistance.
Weak implicatures of political significance can also be triggered once we accept
the representation of the USA as an actual empire and its ensuing threat, among
which (16), (17) and (18), inferable from (13) but also from the global portrayal of
the world in which the USA is a powerful empire:
(16) Since the EU is the USA’s vassal, Switzerland should take its distances from
European policies in order not to fall within USA’s influence
(17) Switzerland’s future must be decided outside worldwide relations of
influence
(18) In order to protect itself, Switzerland should vote UDC, since this party
promotes Switzerland’s economic and political independence
It makes sense to refer to them as weak implicatures to the extent that their
calculation supposes an interpretative procedure which has not been evidenced by
the speaker: we do not indeed find clear indications in the text that Freysinger
intends these contents to be derived by his readers. However, these weak
implicatures are likely to be beneficial in terms of positive cognitive effects: they
are relevant to those who take on Freysinger’s description of the USA as an empire,
since they constitute concrete guidelines for action that would presumably represent
the first steps of resistance against the empire’s expansionist goals.
16 Note that if the target domain had been identified correctly before its explicit mention, the reader
would presumably experience some sort of confirmation effect.
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3.3 Maximising the Construal’s Relevance Through Extended Metaphors:
Epistemic Implications
As said earlier, the mention of an empire in the beginning of the text raises
expectations linked to the prototypical features associated to the concept of empire.
The reader will thus expect to find in the text some sort of justification for the
metaphor. And Freysinger provides it in detail, spending time on numerous
properties of the conceptual source domain in order to find correspondences with
states of affairs that he can link to the target domain, that is, the USA. Thus, as every
property of the source domain is instantiated in the target domain, the likelihood of
what was initially a metaphorical construal becomes gradually justified by concrete
examples. In the text, excerpts (5) to (15) systematically link properties of the
empire to states of affairs:
• (5) refers to the humanitarian aid that the USA allegedly uses to legitimate
occupation thereby validating the property EMPIRES ARE EXPANSIONIST
ENTITIES,
• (6), (7) and (10) make explicit mention of military action and ipso facto validate
the property EMPIRES ARE VIOLENT ENTITIES,
• (8) and (12) assert the control over territories (‘‘circles’’) and (11) names regions
of the world where the USA’s military presence is confirmed, which validate the
property EMPIRES ARE OCCUPYING ENTITIES,
• (9) states that the empire hierarchically dominates its ‘‘valets’’ and (13) and (14)
instantiate the European Union as a servant of the USA, thereby validating the
property EMPIRES ARE ENTITIES WHO ENFORCE DOMINATION OVER
WEAKER ENTITIES
• (15) summons the Swiss historical background to establish its independence
against numerous violent empires, which can function as a way of legitimising
the property EMPIRES COME AND GO IN BLOOD BATHS (which echoes
and reinforces the property of an empire’s inherent violent behaviour).
In this complex extended mapping of the empire, Freysinger manages to quasi-
systematically link various conceptual features to actual states of affairs; in turn, this
makes the mapping more justified, yet no longer as a metaphor, but as a literal
description of the USA as an actual empire. Since all the instantiations of the
metaphorical construal over the text are linked to actual states of affairs, there is
reason to construe them as concrete examples of the conceptual properties of an
empire. This is precisely where the argumentative potential of the extended
metaphor is revealed: if the properties that are listed are systematically connected to
states of affairs, that is, if for each conceptual property Freysinger is able to find an
illustrative concrete example, then these examples could be cognitively taken as
arguments by example in support of the content of the overall metaphorical
construal. Because the metaphor happens to be literally true for a significant number
of properties, it might come to be considered as a true statement by addressees.
The structure of extended metaphor in this text is thus used to provide massive
evidence that we have in fact a strong case for considering the USA as an empire
(and that contextual implications—or weak implicatures—in terms of threat and
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security are subsequently licensed). This is why we argue here in favour of an
elaborate attempt of literalising the metaphor: as long as we assume that metaphor
processing has to do with feature assessment, the strategy consists in providing
evidence to make sure that none of these prototypical features are rejected from the
emerging representation. Relevance, in this case, is achieved the moment ‘‘empire’’
is taken literally: Freysinger ultimately intends his readers to use the literal content
of the metaphor to support his party, which he mentions in the text as follows:
(19) ‘‘Thanks to a determined souverainiste [proponent of sovereignty] party, the
UDC, and to the association for an independent and neutral Switzerland, it
[Switzerland] blocks the neoliberal and internationalist offensive of the new
Europe.’’
‘‘Graˆce a` un parti souverainiste de´termine´, l’UDC, et a` l’association pour
une Suisse inde´pendante et neutre, elle fait barrage a` l’offensive ne´olibe´rale
et internationaliste de la nouvelle Europe.’’
The pamphlet is geared toward eliciting sympathy from the readers towards the only
political party that takes the imperial threat seriously. The argumentative power of
the extended metaphor lies in providing grounds to support the action of the UDC as
described in (19): the conceptual mapping between source and target domain seems
so overwhelmingly relevant (each property is validated by a corresponding state of
affairs) that it cannot be a matter of coincidence. The complex conceptual
correspondence matrix between source and target domain is here warranted by
systematic illustrations related to facts; in this respect, the extended metaphor
functions as an argumentative device geared towards the validation of epistemic
claims.
For this reason, we believe that a strong perlocutionary effect is favoured: in light
of detailed evidence, the speaker is trying to push the reader towards accepting the
metaphor as a literal description, together with its entailments. The argumentative
nature of the relationship between occurrences of properties found in the source
domain and states of affairs adduced by Freysinger as concrete realisations of these
procedures weakens the metaphorical status of the message and therefore
strengthens the grounds to consider that the USA can indeed be literally compared
to an empire. From a psychological point of view, we could even defend that such
an incremental confirmational process is able to induce a heuristic bias known as the
confirmation bias, whereby a subject confronted to repeated, yet far from absolute,
evidence in favour of a specific piece of information he deems believable will rule
out coincidence and strengthen the likeliness of said information. In Freysinger’s
pamphlet, this would be realised through the first instantiation, via a metaphorical
expression, of the assumption that the USA is an empire. This assumption is the
output of the interpretative procedure resulting from the reader’s representation of a
source and target domain. Now, if this assumption is the one that is retained, it will
raise, as mentioned earlier, expectations of relevance that will be fulfilled through
further instantiations of the metaphor. In other words, the requirements of metaphor
processing at the interpretative level will provide the grounds for the confirmation
bias to play its role, which has been experimentally documented as the tendency to
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prefer confirmations of assumptions held by people over disconfirmations (see
Oswald and Grosjean 2004).
Our central argument regarding the effect that extended metaphors may have on
beliefs is thus that their processing, also interpretable as a potential trigger of the
confirmation bias, has an argumentative counterpart that leads to epistemic benefits:
the addressee who processes the extended metaphor within an enabling context
might end up convinced of its literal truth through numerous individual confirma-
tions. What this illustrates in our view is the idea that extended metaphors, when
used argumentatively in political discourse, may gradually lose their metaphorical
status as a result of an evidential relationship building up between instantiations of
the metaphorical construal and its initial (and literal) propositional content. In
Freysinger’s pamphlet, this effect is strengthened through a network of correspon-
dences between the conceptual properties of an empire and the states of affairs
presented as realisations of the latter.
4 Conclusion
The main claim of this paper can be summarised in the form of an argument
grounding the argumentative potential of extended metaphors used in political
discourse, both with respect to the type of processing they induce and with respect
of the epistemic effects they are likely to yield, in particular in what regards belief
fixation.
On the processing side, we postulated that the more each occurrence of the same
metaphor is deemed relevant (and this can be achieved for instance through
systematic links with corresponding states of affairs, as in Freysinger’s pamphlet,
analysed above), the more the metaphor is perceived as relevant and tentatively
taken as a reliable piece of information, i.e., one that gets closer to its literal
meaning. We assume that this is possible because instantiations of the various
conceptual properties involved in the metaphor within the text may be taken as
arguments by example. The rhetorical advantage gained in this process concerns the
epistemic status the metaphorical operation inherits from the relevance of its
multiple instantiations in the text; the information is presented in such a structured
and justified way that it seems to argumentatively ‘hold’, insofar as it is presented as
resulting from what appears to be a careful examination of the conceptual domains
mapped together in the metaphor. One possible consequence of this process is the
loss of metaphorical status: what seemed to be a metaphor at first is justified through
metaphorical extension as a propositional content presented as reflecting an actual
state of affairs. The analysis presented here shows how de-metaphorisation can be
achieved through argumentative means, while yielding epistemic benefits. From a
cognitive perspective, the success of this rhetorical move could be attributed to the
confirmational dynamics described above: it taps into the confirmation bias and
increases the chances of the overall mapping generating a belief in which the
conceptualisation of the USA as an empire is legitimised. Additionally, such a
dynamics meets the requirements of epistemic vigilance filters in what regards
message coherence: the gradual confirmation of the mapping in the extended
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metaphor appears to be coherent. This line of argument therefore allows us to draw
an explicit link between cognitive processing of metaphors and their rhetorical
advantages.
From a broader argumentative perspective, the second argument developed in
this paper considered the effects extended metaphors can have on the speaker’s
perceived competence—or ethos. If the extended conceptual mapping is deemed
relevant by the addressee, chances are that the repercussions for the image of the
speaker will be positive, as the addressee will be led to conclude that only a
competent speaker could have worked out such a complex and what appears to be
appropriate description. As traditional but also more contemporary rhetoric has
shown, personal characteristics of speakers can influence the outcome of the
convincing endeavour. It was also our purpose to defend the idea that extended
metaphors can contribute to ethos-oriented strategies and thereby also override
epistemic vigilance filters that are directed at assessing the trustworthiness of the
source.
From a methodological perspective, finally, we hope to have shown that there is
an explanatory advantage to be gained from the combination of cognitive pragmatic
aspects of information processing on the one hand and from the input of
argumentation theory on the other. Accounting for the conditions under which
people end up being convinced by discursive means has to incorporate some
cognitive explanation. It is, we believe, by trying to assess the relationship between
understanding and believing at the interface of language and cognition that the
analysis of discourse can gain psychological plausibility and therefore explanatory
power.
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